Service accounts never got a manager.
The account that syncs Salesforce to Okta has the same access as a person and none of the accountability. AppGovern finds every non-human identity, shows where it reaches, and makes a named person own it.
The problems this solves.
Incident response starts from scratch
An agent misbehaves, a service account is compromised, an app is breached. The first hour is spent finding out who built it, who owns it, and who can turn it off.
See the problemFormer employees still have access
The engineer leaves. Her agents keep running on her credentials. Her local admin in Snowflake and the service account she created in 2023 still work.
Nobody owns the decision to retire it
Bot accounts, agents, and apps unused for 90 days still hold access, and the renewal still auto-pays, because nobody owns the decision.
Every one of these has the same root cause: nobody owns it. See all six problems
Detect, own, and retire.
Find them by comparing against HR.
An account that is not in your HR system and matches the patterns you define is probably not a person. Run the simulation, review what would match, then sync for real on a schedule.
- Data sources you choose: which app is HR, which is the identity provider
- Pattern rules you define
- Employees can report the bot account they inherited
Owner, probable owner, and observers.
Every non-human identity carries an owner, a secondary owner, and observers. When nobody owns one, probable owners are proposed from last use and the apps it touches.
- Reassign or modify owners
- Change type between bot and service account
- Review and approve reported identities
Dormant accounts get a decision.
A bot account nobody has used in 90 days still holds access. The owner is asked to delete it, remove it, or reduce its footprint.
- Configurable dormant window
- Risk score with weights you set
- Every decision logged
See it in your own tenant.
Free 14-day proof of concept. Read-only, success criteria agreed before we start, readout on day 14.