Identity governance for the identities Okta cannot see.
Your identity provider governs the people who sign in through SSO. AppGovern governs those plus the local accounts inside your apps, the service accounts behind your integrations, and the agents nobody registered.
The problems this solves.
Former employees still have access
The engineer leaves. Her agents keep running on her credentials. Her local admin in Snowflake and the service account she created in 2023 still work.
Audits take weeks and get rubber-stamped
Agent and app access gets certified, if at all, by a generic admin with no idea what the identity does. Every cycle starts from scratch.
Incident response starts from scratch
An agent misbehaves, a service account is compromised, an app is breached. The first hour is spent finding out who built it, who owns it, and who can turn it off.
See the problemEvery one of these has the same root cause: nobody owns it. See all six problems
Straight answers.
Does it cover non-SSO apps?
Yes. Discovery uses mail, sign-in, and device signals, not only identity provider sync. App Connections then reaches inside each app and separates identity provider users from local users, with their roles.
How are owners detected?
Probable owners are proposed from usage, admin status, configuration history, and previous-owner matching, then a person accepts. Ownership is counted only after acceptance.
Does Just-in-Time access go through the IdP or the app?
Both. Grants target an identity provider group, a role or group inside the app, or an AppGovern role, and the approver is the owner of that access.
What the first 14 days prove.
Read-only, in your own tenant. Success criteria are written down before day one.
See it in your own tenant.
Free 14-day proof of concept. Read-only, success criteria agreed before we start, readout on day 14.